Wednesday, July 31, 2019
Philosophy metaphysics Essay
In order to clearly answer the first question, it is important first to answer the question ââ¬â ââ¬Å"what is the soul for Aristotleâ⬠and as such give an account of how he views substance and separability. Aristotle posits in de Anima that the soul is the substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thingââ¬â¢s essence. That means that it is ââ¬Å"ââ¬â¢the essential whatnessââ¬â¢Ã¢â¬â¢ of a body of the character just assigned. (Book II, 412b). As such, the soul is the essence of being and the essence of being is its substance. By being, Aristotle refers to the thing itself while by essence he refers to the primary essence of the thing itself wherein one is treated as the subject in its own right i. e. the good itself is treated as the essence of the good. It can be deduced then, using hypothetical syllogism that if soul is the essence of a being and the essence of being is its substance, then the soul is the substance of a being. He argued further that whatever is has a being, whatever has a being has a substance ââ¬â this as the grounding of his epistemology. Hence, whatever is has a substance. This implies then that being is identical to substance. If such is the case, then using the principle of excluded middle, being is also identical to soul. Now, let us elucidate the concept of separability. Aristotle first distinguished the difference between the body and the soul. The body as he stated corresponds to what exists in potentiality, it being the subject or matter of a possible actuality. Soul, on the other hand, is a substance (actuality) in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it; it is the actuality of the body. Aristotle, Book II, 421b) As he delineates the dissimilarity between the body and soul, one should not be mislead in regarding the two as separate entities. They are at some point seems to be separate for in the former we are talking about a corporeal body in its spatio-temporal existence while in the latter we are talking of an incorporeal body transcending in the spatio-temporal world. However, their separability in terms of space and time does not mean they are separate as whole ââ¬â that is an entity having life. As Aristotle argues ââ¬Å"the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily partsâ⬠. (Aristotle, Book II, 413a). He argues further that ââ¬Å"body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body and a body of a definite kindâ⬠. (Book I, 421a). It can be deduced then that soul and the body are inseparable with each other. It is because the essence of both their existence lies in the interdependency of their telos ââ¬â the soul actualizing the potential life in the body while the body providing an entity for the soul to actualize itself in the material world. Since the soul is the actuality of natural body, then naturally it would have certain functions which it can actualize. Aristotle has identified these functions to be the following: (1. ) powers of self-nutrition or the nutritive function; (2. powers of sensation which includes the sensory and appetitive function; (3. ) the power of movement and rest or the locomotive function and (4. ) the power of thinking. With these functions, he posited a psychic power of hierarchy. He claimed that of the psychic powers mentioned above, some kinds of beings posses all of these, some possess less than all while others posses only one. As such, evidently, the plants possess the p ower of self-nutrition wherein they can grow up or down and increase or decrease in all direction as long they can find nutrients in the soil. It is through their own means that they continue tolive. Even though the plants possess only one function of the soul, it is a great wonder how they continuously subsist on their own. Next is the power of sensation, which is possessed by all animals. All animals possessed the power of sensation because they all have the primary form of sense, which is touch. Aristotle defended and further elaborated this notion in de Anima. To wit: if any order of living things has the sensory, it must also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now all animals have one sense at least, viz. ouch, and whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire, for desire is just appetition of what is pleasant. (BookII, 414b) From the arguments stated above, it can be evidently inferred not just how Aristotle proven that all animals possess at least one sense, the touch, but also how he sci entifically deduced that all animals by virtue of their sensory function, possess appetitive function, too. From all these animals, there are some which possessed the power of locomotion, advancing them to a higher stratum. These are animals which can execute any kind of movements together with the capacity to halt such movement. Lastly, the human beings possessed all of the above-mentioned functions placing them on the top of the hierarchy. They posses the power of thinking, which is the essential feature of the human beings and which separates them apart from all other species. Analyzing the theoretical framework Aristotle succumbed to, it can be construed then that for him every being has a soul. This is evidently manifested in his attempt to prove the groundings of his epistemology extending his claim to the psychic hierarchy wherein he posited that every kind of living thing ââ¬â any entity for that matter possesses certain function/s of the soul It should be put in mind, however, that even Aristotle posited the different functions of the soul; they are in essence, inseparable. An example of this is the function of nutrition (by eating) which human beings in particular do in order to properly and clearly think. The latter being also a function of the soul. Evidently, every function of the soul is interconnected with each other especially in the case of the Homo sapiens, who possessed all the enumerated functions of the soul. Aristotle notions of intellect can be rooted in his conception of knowledge ââ¬â in his epistemology. It is from his conception of knowledge arises his other assertions on how he views the world. It is common sensical then to claim that his conception of the mind or any other things transcending from their spatio-temporal existence, his metaphysics, is grounded on his epistemology. As such, it is with utmost importance to first answer how Aristotle regards the nature of knowledge and how does one able to acquire knowledge so as to provide an answer on his notion of intellect. Knowledge for him can only be found within the material world ââ¬â that is things, which are intelligible by senses. It is then through our experience with this objects in their spatio-temporal existence that we come to know them. He mentioned the processes of how we can arrive to know these objects ââ¬â by perception, discrimination and thinking. By perception here, I mean the process of how our senses operate to recognize things in the material word. Discrimination then comes simultaneous with perception in order to give a concrete description of the thing being perceived. In example, upon the perception of a certain plant, we can able to distinguish its structure and other ontical features as the mind started to categorized. As a corollary, we arrived at the conclusion that what we perceived is indeed a plant. From there, we judged that what we perceived is indeed a plant and hence, arriving in the state of thinking. It can be deduced then that through thinking, one can able to comprehend the ontical features of an object and by virtue oneââ¬â¢s reason, its primary essence. By primary essence, I mean the telos or the end itself of a thing. Since reason for Aristotle is innate in human beings so is intellect. It is because for Aristotle, reason is an essential property of the mind ââ¬â that is of the intellect. If that is the case, then reason for Aristotle is relatively tantamount to the intellect. Husserl, on the other hand regarded the process of intuition as the first level of cognition wherein the objects are grasp in its original thru experience. This is also the case when one is cognizing objects of mere representations which includes but not limited to pictorial intuitions and any means of symbolic indications. To wit, experiencing is consciousness that intuits something and values it to be actual; experiencing is intrinsically characterized as consciousness of the natural object in question and of it as the original: there is consciousness of the original as being there ââ¬Å"in person. The same thing can be expressed by saying that objects would be nothing at all for the cognizing subject if they did not ââ¬Å"appearâ⬠to him, if he had of them no ââ¬Å"phenomenon. â⬠Here, therefore, ââ¬Å"phenomenonâ⬠signifies a certain content that intrinsically inhabits the intuitive consciousness in question and is the substrate for its actuality valuation. (Husserl, p. 3) It is only but logical to infer that experience plays a vital role in the cognition of a certain object. As such, it is only upon experience, can one theorized and moved to a higher level of cognition. A thing must first be intuited before one can theorize about them. And after theorizing, comes the process of reflection. Evidently, both Aristotle and Husserl believed in the value of experience in which the former calls perception and the latter intuition. From these processes arises higher forms of cognition wherein the end result for Aristotle is thinking through the use of reason while for Husserl, it is pure reflection as a result of phenomenology. It is then with utmost importance to first clarify, what does Husserl meant by intellect and Ego. As such, in what process does a person uses his intellect. Furthermore, what is the difference of reflection from pure reflection and of the empirical Ego to the transcendental Ego? Also, one should answer the question ââ¬Å"what is phenomenology? â⬠and ââ¬Å"why it is only through this process one can arrive at pure reflection? â⬠For Husserl, intellect is identical with consciousness as Ego is identical to Self. As such, when one speaks of intellect, one is referring to consciousness and vice-versa. Such is also the case with the Ego and the Self. Reflection is the process wherein one is looking not towards the act of reflection itself but rather in the direction of the objects one is conscious of. As such, one is absorbed in reflecting how these objects exist rather than asking how they come into being or essentially, enquiring on their primordial existence. If the consciousness is moving towards this kind of reflection, then the Ego is only in his/her ontical (empirical) status. Pure reflection, on the other hand, is the process wherein the consciousness is reflecting his consciousness ââ¬â that is the act of reflection per se. This is the case wherein the Ego transcends from his ontical stage by describing the events i. e. relating, referring, combining, et al in his consciousness. And this can only be done thru the process of phenomenology. What is phenomenology then? Phenomenology is defined as the science of consciousness. (Husserl, p. 5) It is the process of describing the things and events themselves in their primordial sense through the use of phenomenological reduction. Phenomenological reduction then is the process wherein one suspends his/her preconceived notion of things in order to objectively describe the objects and events as what it appears to them. It only thru this process that we can arrive at pure reflection because this is the only method wherein objects and events are describe as themselves without concurring to any established principle or assumption. Evidently, Aristotleââ¬â¢s notion of intellect and Husserlââ¬â¢s notion of Ego posited the strength of mind in general ââ¬â transcending from space and time. If that is the case, then the conception of a person is not only confined within the physical realm ââ¬â that is he can do things beyond the limit of his physical existence in his journey to unravel the primordial existence of objects and any discipline for that matter. However, what sets them apart from each other is their notion on how one can really grasp the ontological state of an object or in the words of Kant ââ¬âtheir intentionality. Aristotle believed that one can only know the ontological state of a thing by referring to its primary essence, its telos as the context clue in able to grasp the objectââ¬â¢s primary essence. For Husserl, on the other hand, it is only through the use of phenomenological method can one comprehend the ontological state of objects. In Being and Time, Heidegger attempted to know the meaning of a Being ââ¬â that is the Dasein, by starting to ask and redefine the fundamental question of ââ¬Å"What is a Being? â⬠He further continued this method by asking the ontological question of Being ââ¬â that only a being can know his Being because he is consciousness to his Being by his being. His starting point is the fact that a being is a Being-in-the-World. He is a being situated in this world. As such, it is only him who can know his being by virtue of his ontic-ontological character. If that is the case, then it is only him who can determine his possibilities by virtue of being a spatio-temporal entity. Since no other entities can determine his possibilities as a being conscious of his existence, then the Dasein solely can ascertain his existentiall. It can be deduced then that the task of Dasein is to transcend to his existentiell in order to arrive at his ontological status. He can only do this by maximizing his possibilities to know himself thru the things which are ready-at-hand ââ¬â things which can help him to reveal his being to him. It should be kept in mind that this process of knowing the Dasein does not go in hermeneutic circles rather on a back and forth condition Dasein as a spatio-temporal entity is facing a hard time to know his being because there is a tendency that he might be too absorb in his world or fall. Yet what Heidegger wants to emphasize is that he as a Dasein should not conceive his being as a spatio-temporal entity an encumbrance to his Being. It is because it is only through this world he can have his possibilities. This separates him from other entities and makes him a Dasein. Evidently, Heideggerââ¬â¢s notion of Dasein greatly gives importance to the relationship of the Being and the world which is also apparent in Aristotle notion of intellect and Husserlââ¬â¢s notion of Ego. However, what separates the former from the latter is that it focused on providing an answer on how one can transcend to his facticity in order to ontologically know his Being. The latter, on the other hand, focuses in discovering the essence and the ontological existence of the objects in the material world. Transcendental phenomenology is defined in general as the study of essence. It designates two things: a new kind of descriptive method which made a breakthrough in philosophy at the turn of the century, and an a priori science derived from it; a science which is intended to supply the basic instrument for a rigorously scientific philosophy and, in its consequent application, to make possible a methodical reform of all the sciences. (Husserl, p. 15) Essentially, transcendental phenomenology then is a description of phenomena. Husserl, then, laid down the method to achieve the objective of reforming all the sciences. The first step is the use of phenomenological epoche or reduction or bracketing wherein one suspends or take away all his/her biases and prejudices in order to ââ¬Å"objectively describeâ⬠a phenomena. By doing this, we can arrive at a universal description of a phenomena. This will be followed by the compare and contrast method which one will have to undertake in order to arrive at the pure data of things. It appears then that by suspending oneââ¬â¢s judgment and undergoing the intersubjectivity test, we can arrive at the ââ¬Å"pure data of thingsâ⬠. In relation to this, Husserl claims that this method should be followed by all sciences in order to answer their primordial condition. It is held that sciences cannot escape their dogmas because it fails to question how they come to be. What they are just doing is a mere adaptation of established principles proven in the past to be true. Since these established principles were proven in the past to be true, scientists or people who work in the sciences do not make any attempt to further verify the truthfulness of their established principles ââ¬â that is how and why is it the case that such principles were held to be true. For indisputably, things cannot just come into being without any rationalization, scientific explanation for that matter. Sciences have constructed ready-made answers to all things ââ¬â their nature, existence, feature, et al; grounded on the preconceived notion that sciences have already provided sufficient answers to the primitiveness of these objects. While sciences are busy in explaining these things [the ready-made answers], they failed to realized that they were not able to arrived at the Isness of these objects, on how they come into being. However, since the sciences had already deceived the people, that in the past, it already provided sufficient answers to the primordial existence of things, it appears then they are seemingly contented and satisfied by what the sciences have achieved. This is what phenomenology wants to deconstruct ââ¬â it wanted to create a paradigm shift by destroying the ââ¬Å"traditionâ⬠institutionalized by science and overcoming relativism and subjectivism by the use of phenomenological reduction. From these, one can arrive at the pure data of consciousness. It is in this sense, that phenomenology becomes transcendental. Phenomenology is different from descriptive psychology because it draws upon pure reflection exclusively, and pure reflection excludes, as such, every type of external experience and therefore precludes any co positing of objects alien to consciousness. (Husserl, p. 7) Descriptive psychology then does not depend upon pure reflection exclusively; it needs psychological experiencing which would result to the reflection of the external experience. As such, consciousness itself becomes something transcendent, becomes an event in that spatial world which appears, by virtue of consciousness, to be transcendent. (Husserl, p. 7) It can be inferred then that phenomenology focuses solely on the consciousness per se of a being making it the science of consciousness while descriptive psychology focuses on the consciousness of a being in his psychic experiences. Transcendental idealism states that ââ¬Å"everything intuited in space and time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. â⬠(Kant, p. 1) As such, it posits that one cannot have the knowledge of the realm beyond the empirical ââ¬â that is one cannot experience objects outside space and time. It is because the mind as Kant argues having certain constraints [in reference to space and time] ââ¬â can only grasp the noesis of the object but not its noumena ââ¬â the objectââ¬â¢s intentionality. It can be inferred then that transcendental idealismââ¬â¢s fundamental assertions lies on two grounds: first, objects by themselves exudes intentionality; and secondly, we can never know their intentionality [or noumena] because our mind can only grasp the noesis or what is appearing to us. Phenomenology believes on Kantââ¬â¢s first claim that indeed objects have their own intentionality but vies the second assertion. As such, its emergence as a domain of study in philosophy is grounded on its thrust to prove that indeed the mind can know the noumena of objects. Phenomenology believes that this can be done using eidetic reductionism proving to all that the mind can transcend beyond the physical realm ââ¬â beyond space and time. Essentially, all the philosophies which were tackled in this paper seek to explain and interpret the world ââ¬â including the objects within it and the beings living in it; from the primordial existence of things up to the authentication of oneââ¬â¢s Being.
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